In this article we investigate the impact of trade openness on labor force participation rate. We use tariff rate as the main indicator of trade openness and we employ the number of regional trade agreements and the average tariff rate in the neighbors' countries as instrumental variables to diminish the endogeneity problem of the tariff rate.We find that trade openness increases the participation rate which is economically and statistically significant. The results show that this correlation is robust under controlling for different variables and using various specifications.
Introduction
In this article we estimate empirically the relation between participation rate and trade openness (our main indicator for openness is tariff rate Despite the importance of labor market in political discussion about international trade, most of classical theories in international trade which aim to estimate the welfare effects of free trade, assume full employment and perfect reallocation of labor force to sectors with comparative advantage, for practical purpose. However, violation of these assumptions can have significant effect on the welfare gain of trade.
At the end of 90s, some prominent articles investigated the subject of the changes in labor market equilibrium after a decrease in trade barriers. These articles adopt two main approaches: Some articles concentrate on changes in unemployment rate following trade openness and some others measure the extent and pace of labor force reallocation to sectors with comparative advantage.
Although these articles release the assumption of full employment, they assume the 2 tariff rate might be endogenous to labor market conditions since some countries may have ran simultaneous reforms in labor market policies as well as trade policies participation rate to be constant. Therefore, they can explain the changes in unemployment rate through job creation and destruction exclusively. However, in general, trade openness may affect the incentives of agents to enter or exit the labor market and it will lead to changes in unemployment rate as well. For example, trade may induce participation in labor market by enhancing positive expectation about labor condition in exporting industries. In this paper we show that changes in labor force population accounts for about 27% of changes in unemployment rate and the rest is due to changes in unemployed population.
It is important to identify the changes in participation rate following a trade openness since it can influence the interpretation of welfare gain from trade. More precisely, if trade openness enhance unemployment, it is important to determine whether it is a consequence of job destruction or increase in participation rate. If it is a result of the first, it can attenuate welfare gains from trade; however, if it is a follow-up of the later, it may even boost welfare gains.
This article is related to two trends of researches which focus on the relation between labor market outcomes and inernational integration: First, articles which evaluate the changes in labor market condition, specifically changes in unemployment rate, after a trade openness; second, articles which estimate the scale of labor force reallocation to the industries with comparative advantage. and Dix-Carneiro (2014) [12] calculate the cost of reallocation for workers which they estimate to be multiple times of annual average wage of a worker. Hence, this high cost of reallocation dissipate at least half of expected welfare gains from free trade [12] .
All these researches attempt to include labor market into free trade evaluation assuming labor force to be constant; however, in general case, changes in participation rate may have significant influence on assessing trade openness. Increase in participation rate indicate long-term positive expectation about economic conditions despite plausible short-term negative consequences. On the other hand, as Pissarides (1990) [31] 
Empirical Strategy
In both classic and advance trade theories (see for example Melitz (2008) [29] and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) [10] ), it is emphasized that trade openness will enhance aggregate total factor productivity and consequently, increase the average wages. On the other hand, Pissarides (1990) [31] shows that more people will participat when wages are higher, labor market tightness is higher and the rates of interest and job loss is lower.
Following this theoretical approach, we assert that trade openness will elicit positive expectation about the economic condition among people and hence, they will participate more in the labor market since the expected value of participation rise when average wages increase.
We introduce the following specification to test the empirical relationship between participation rate and trade openness indicator which is mostly average tariff rate in a panel of 93 countries during 22 years:
In which P tc represents participation rate in year t in country c, τ tc is trade openness indi- change rate. Plus, in the short term, inflation rate is correlated with unemployment and consequently, participation decision through the mechanism of Philips curve.
Size of government is another control variable. Custom tariff is a source of tax income for the government hence, it has the incentive to raise the revenue from this source; on the other hand, large governments have high resources to interfere in the labor market as it is the case in welfare states. Black market exchange rate and exchange rate variability are two variables controlled to capture the effect of black market in both trade and labor markets. Legal system property rights is a significant factor determining the decision of participating in formal labor market; moreover, if property rights are not precisely defined, custom tax is the most reliable income source for the government and hence, it will intend to increase trade taxes.
Employment in agriculture is also another important determinants of both trade and labor market policies. In countries in which most people are working in agriculture sector, participation rate is generally high because of the special form of agricultural jobs. It is easy to get a job with little skills and frictions in the labor matching is low. On the other hand, since poor countries depend largely on agricultural production, this sector benefit several exceptions in trade agreements under surveillance of WTO. Thus, we insert the share of value added of agriculture sector of GDP to control the effect of the agriculture sector.
We also include base year GDP per capita multiplied by time trend to capture divergence of countries with different initial income. Finally, lead of GDP per capita is controlled to capture the expectation about future of the economy. In the next section,
we present a summary of our data described above.
Data Description
In this article we use the trade and labor market along with other macroeconomics data from 93 countries during 1990 to 2012. We restricted our sample to 93 countries for which we had the data both for labor market and trade indicators (a list of countries can be found in the appendix). Table 1 displays the summary statistics of our main variables.
We obtain data on participation rate from "International Labor Organization (ILO)".
Participation rate is defined as the ratio of total number of labor force i.e. employed and We have also droped the countries with less than 9 observations in both trade and labor market indicators.
Tariff rate is defined as the ratio of total annual custom tax income to the value of import multiplied by 100. The data is obtained from Clemens and Williamson(2002) [7] for years before 2002 and "World Integrated Trade Solution (TRAINS)" for 2002-2012.
We have checked the similarity of the two data sets for years available in both data sets;
however, we also control for year dummies in order to be sure about no specific annual measurement error. Average tariff rate ranges approximately from 1%-54% and its aver- The data of GDP per capita is obtained from "World Bank" and it is adjucted for inflation using United States GDP deflator. GDP per capita ranges from 188 dollars in least developed economies such as Afghanistan and Ethiopia to 85000 dollars in OECD economies. The average GDP per capita in our data set is approximately 14000 dollars.
Inflation rate is also obtained from "World Bank". It has a range of -17% to 2700%.
Its low rates are observed in countries such as Oman in 2009 and its high rates in countries such as Brazil in 1990 which has experienced a period of hyper inflations.
We also use Labor Regulation variable to control for labor market conditions. The data for Labor Regulation is obtained from "Freedom of the World" institute. It is constituted of nine different variables and is indexed in a measure of 0 to 10 if here is no friction in the labor market, the country gets a score of 10 and if the labor market is completely regulated, the country gets 0. For practical purpose, we transfer this index so that it indicates labor market frictions, with 0 represents no friction and 10 represents the market with maximum friction (we do so by differencing this index from 10). On average, the countries in our data set get a score of 4 in this index.
We also include other macroeconomic variables to control for factors influencing both labor and trade conditions to decrease the omitted variable bias. These variables consist of the size of government, property right index, black market exchange rate, exchange rates variability,share of value added of agriculture sector of total GDP. and they are obtained from "World Bank" and "Freedom of the World" institute.
Besides, we address three problems of omitted variable bias, reverse causality and measurement error using the method of two stage least square employing number of regional trade agreements and average tariff rate in neighboring countries. We believe that Average tariff rate in countries with high number of RTAs is 1.5 percentage point lower than countries with low number of RTAs. This difference is statistically significant with t-stat 3.8. This fact roughly illustrates the relevance of the IV variable which will be discussed with more precision later in the first stage regression.
Furthermore, the data in table 2 is also split in two groups according to average tariff rate in each country. Participation rate in countries with high tariff rate is 1.5 percentage point lower than countries with low tariff rate and this difference is statistically significant with t-stat 3.6 which will be demonstrated with more detail in the second stage regression. [14] . For this purpose, we use the growth of tariff rate (annual changes in tariff rate) as the instrumental variable for tariff rate. This instrument is also significant and its weakness can be ruled out. This IV can be used to check the robustness of the result with a different IV. This relationship is also valid using alternative IV or trade openness indicator. In the third column, growth of tariff is used as the IV for level of tariff rate. The results are negative and significant and its magnitude is close to the main regression. In the fourth column, openness variable is used instead of tariff rate and it is instrumented in a similar way. Openness is defined as the ratio of trade volume over GDP and its result of this regression is consistent with the first column; higher openness is correlated with higher participation rate.
At this point, we can employ the same startegy to separate the effect of changes in participation and unemployment population on unemployment rate. We know that unemployment rate = unemployment population labor force population
. Hence, with a logarithmic transformation we can seperate the changes as follows: %∆unemployment rate = %∆unemployment population− %∆labor force population. To estimate the percentage changes in above variables we employ a log-linear regression similar to equation 1. Table 5 shows the results. All coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level. One percentage point decrease in tariff rate is correlated with 4.31% decrease in unemployment population and 1.66% increase in participation rate which implies that 27% of the changes in unemployment rate is due to the changes in labor force. Therefore, we cannot deny the role of participating population on when analyzing the relationship between trade and labor market conditions.
We now show that our estimation is robust in different country groups, specifications and in presence of various controlling variables. The coefficient of average tariff rate remains negative and significant by running separate regression in developing and developed countries. The magnitude is higher than average in developed economies and lower in developing countries. This may be due to bigger informal sector in developing countries for which we cannot capture the data of participation rate. The results are also valid excluding economies with high inflation rate and highly populated countries. (See Table 7 shows the results of the estimation of equation 1 including various control variables. In all columns, the coefficient of tariff rate is negative and statistically significant and its magnitude is between 0.4 to 0.55.
Among control variables, size of government and agriculture to GDP are statistically significant. The coefficient for the size of government is positive which imply that larger governments are correlated with higher participation rate which is prevalent in western European countries. Moreover, the agriculture to GDP is positive and significant which confirm the intuition that agricultural economies have high participation rates 5 . Table 7 Table shows the robustness of the baseline estimation. In all regressions RTA and average tariff rate of neighboring countries are used as an IV for average annual tariff rate. Labor market regulations is an index of 0-10 for which 0 assigns to economies with no regulation in the labor market and 10 to economies with maximum level of regulations. Size of government, Property right an Black market premium are also index variables ranging from 0-10 with 0 for small governments, low property rights and low black market premium in exchange rate. Agriculture to GDP is the share of value added in agriculture sector to GDP. Exchange rate variability is the distance of exchange rate for one US dollar from its long-run trend. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered in income group level
In table 8, we change the regression specification. In all these different specifications, panel fixed effect regression with no time fixed effects, pooled OLS regression and random effect regression, the coefficient of tariff rate remains negative and significant as it is the case in previous tables. In the first column, year dummies are dropped, instead, initial level of GDP per capita multiplied by time trend is controlled. The interaction of initial GDP per capita and time trend has a negative and significant coefficient and since GDP is positively correlated with participation rate, this indicates that participation rates in different countries are converging. Furthermore, lead of GDP per capita is controlled to capture expectation to the future of the economy; as it was expected, optimism about future of the economy positively correlated with participation rate since it increases the expected wage [29] and consequently the present discounted value of unemployment; in other words, unemployment becomes more valuable in comparison to staying out of the labor force. [31] Column 2 represents the pooled OLS regression with country and time fixed effects included. The coefficient of tariff rate in this regression is still negative and significant and its magnitude is of the same order of former estimates. Fourth and third columns display the random effect regression in which geographical region and income groups are controlled. In all these alternative specifications, the estimated relation between tariff rate and participation rate is robust.
Heterogeneous Effect
In this section we estimate the effect of trade barriers on participation rate in different quantiles of the dependent variable. For this purpose, we run an IV quantile regression for ten quantiles of participation rate in the baseline regression. Figure 2 shows that in lower quantiles of participation rate the magnitude of the correlation between this variable and average tariff rate is comparable to the mean estimation and it decreases in higher quantiles in which the coefficient becomes positive although insignificant. In these estimates, labor market regulations, time and country fixed effects are controlled and RTA and average tariff rate in neighboring countries are used as instrumental variables for tariff rate.
With another approach, we aim to investigate the heterogeneous effects of different controlling variables. For this purpose, we insert the interaction between controlling vari- ables described in the previous section and average tariff rate into the baseline regression. Table 9 shows the results. Only two variables, labor market regulations and size of government, intensify the relationship between participation rate and average tariff rate i.e.
the coefficient of average tariff rate rises with increase in labor regulations and size of government. All other variables attenuate the relationship. 
Labor regulations GDP percapita Size of government Inflation Agriculture to GDP Property rights In all regressions RTA and average tariff rate of neighboring countries are used as an IV for average annual tariff rate. Labor market regulations is an index of 0-10 for which 0 assigns to economies with no regulation in the labor market and 10 to economies with maximum level of regulations. Size of government, Property right an Black market premium are also index variables ranging from 0-10 with 0 for small governments, low property rights and low black market premium in exchange rate. Agriculture to GDP is the share of value added in agriculture sector to GDP. Control variables are specified in the column
header. C * τ shows the interaction term between corresponding control variable and average tariff rate. Standard errors are clustered in income group level. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Long-run Effect
In this section we try to evaluate the long-run relationship of participation rate and trade barrier. For this purpose, we take three strategies: first, we average our observations in 5 year intervals and repeat the previous regression. Second, we run cross-sectional regression of 5 year average of variables in the previous empirical model which is considered to be close to long-run estimation; third, we insert 3 and 5 lags of tariff rate and calculate the sum of immediate and correspondent lags which is the net impact after 3 or 5 years. 
Participation Participation Participation Participation Participation Participation Note:In all regressions RTA and average tariff rate of neighboring countries are used as an IV for average annual tariff rate. All variables are averaged over separate 5-year period and OLS cross sectional regression are run for each period indicated above. Labor market regulations is an index of 0-10 for which 0 assigns to economies with no regulation in the labor market and 10 to economies with maximum level of regulations. t-statistics are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 11 shows the cross-sectional regression for four separate 5-year intervals. Except for the 1998-2002, all other estimation are negative and significant and their absolute magnitude are larger than previous estimation which confirm the results of the previous regression. Table 12 displays the baseline regression and regressions including 3 and 5 lags of average tariff rate. The last two rows delineate the sum of immediate and lag coefficients and χ 2 statistics for significance of the sum, respectively. This estimation indicate that long-run relationship is more severe than immediate estimation which is compatible with the result of table 11. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect after 3 years is higher than after 5 years. This suggests that although the long-run effect is more serious than short-run, the correlation between participation rate and trade barriers does not grow continuously with time.
Conclusion
One of the most prominent arguments supporting trade barriers is protecting labor market from international competition. In this article we study empirically the relationship The results are robust to inclusion of various control variables such as GDP per capita, size of government, black market exchange rate, property rights, employment in agriculture, etc. We have also tested the sensitivity of estimations to other regression specifications; the coefficients are also negative and significant in pooled and between regressions. Moreover, the results are confirmed using another trade indicator i.e. trade volume over GDP and using an alternative IV for tariff rate which was growth in tariff rate.
Ten percentage point decrease in tariff rate is associated with 4-6 percentage point increase in participation rate and this relationship is more severe in the long-run (approximately, 8-12 percentage point in the long-run). Furthermore, participation rates are converging in different countries. We have also found that changes in labor force population explains for about 27% of the changes in unemployment rate and the rest is due to the changes in unemployed population.
In prospective researches, one can construct a theoretical model based on the model presented in Pissarides [31] in an open economy to infer the mechanism behind the results of this paper and study the data with more precision. In this article we attribute the results to the positive expectation about future economic condition, in the model, we will investigate how different factors affect this optimism and consequently, labor market outcomes. 
